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‘The Only Absolute Guarantee’

A Brief on Canada’s Nuclear Weapons Policies

Presented to the Department of Foreign Affairs and
International Trade “Dialogue on Foreign Policy”

By the Canadian Pugwash Group

April, 2003
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The Canadian Pugwash Group1 submits this Brief on Nuclear
Weapons Issues to the Government of Canada for its Dialogue on Foreign
Policy. The Brief responds to two Questions for Discussion:
• “What should be our distinctive role in promoting global
security?”
• “Should Canada do more to address conditions giving rise to
conflict and insecurity beyond our borders? If so, where?”

A. Current Canadian Policy
Foreign Minister Bill Graham recapitulated the priorities of Canada’s
non-proliferation arms control and disarmament policy in his address to the
Conference on Disarmament March 19, 2002.
We seek the total elimination of all weapons of mass
destruction. To that end we will work to achieve the full
implementation of the 13 Practical Steps agreed to at the
2000 NPT Review Conference. In that context, we want
early entry into force of the CTBT and, in the interim, the
most effective organization we can devise to support the
treaty regime. The political value of nuclear weapons
must be devalued, particularly because their purpose is
primarily political. The negative security assurances
provided by nuclear-weapon states to non-nuclear
weapon states party to the NPT are a vital element in
international security and must be preserved and
respected. …
The Minister called for vigilance in protecting the legal regime that
underpins the multilateral system.

1

The Canadian Pugwash Group is the Canadian branch of Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs,
which, along with its then President, Sir Joseph Rotblat, was awarded the 1995 Nobel Peace Prize “for their efforts to
diminish the part played by nuclear arms in international politics and in the longer run to diminish such arms.”.
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Our societies are based on the rule of law, and the sustainable,
shared global future we seek must have the same basis,
however difficult it may be to obtain universal acceptance of
the rules and establish effective means of enforcement.
Canada showed its commitment to the NPT 13 Steps (see Appendix
“A”) by voting in favour of the New Agenda Coalition omnibus resolution,
“Towards a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World: The Need for a New Agenda,” at
UNGA 57. Canada was the only NATO country to vote yes.
The resolution upheld inter alia:
• A call for the Conference on Disarmament to establish an ad
hoc committee to deal with nuclear disarmament;
• Entry-into-force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and
maintenance of the moratorium on test explosions;
• Resumption of negotiations on a treaty banning the production
of fissile materials;
• Prevention of an arms race in outer space;
• Nuclear Weapons States to maintain security assurances not to
use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states.
• Destruction of all nuclear warheads affected by the treaty
process to make nuclear disarmament irreversible.
• Requirement, ultimately, of a universal, multilaterally
negotiated legally binding instrument for a nuclear-weapon-free
world.
At the same time, Canada abstained on a second New Agenda
Coalition resolution calling for tactical nuclear weapons to be included as an
integral part of the nuclear arms reduction and disarmament process. The
resolution was aimed at the removal of the 180 U.S. tactical nuclear
weapons stationed on the soil of six European NATO countries, which call
themselves non-nuclear: Belgium, Greece, Netherlands, Germany, Italy, and

3

Turkey. The abstention was caused by Canada’s reluctance to oppose
NATO policy. The NATO Strategic Concept holds that nuclear weapons are
“essential” and must be kept up-to-date as “credible deterrence.” Referring
to the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons in European countries, NATO
says: “There is a clear rationale for a continued, though much reduced,
presence of sub-strategic forces in Europe.”
Canada’s efforts to get NATO to review its nuclear weapons policies
flowed from the 1998 report of the Parliamentary Committee on Foreign
Affairs and International Trade. The Committee, chaired by Bill Graham,
M.P. (before he assumed his present portfolio), urged Canada to “argue
forcefully” within NATO for a re-examination of the nuclear component in
the Strategic Concept. A review of sorts was started, but it came to naught,
with NATO re-affirming the central tenet of the Strategic Concept: nuclear
weapons are “essential”. While the NATO document makes it clear that the
“Paragraph 32” process is finished, the door was left open to further
discussion on the question. Paragraph 96 of the NATO Report of December
14, 2000, said: “… The Alliance will continue to broaden its engagement
with interested nongovernmental organizations, academic institutions and
the general public.” NATO further acknowledged that it is important for
NATO Allies to maintain and reinvigorate the flow of information with and
about relevant international bodies in this field (Paragraph 115).
The Government of Canada should be commended for having raised
this issue in NATO, but its efforts cannot stop now. The gravest threat to the
viability of the Non-Proliferation Treaty is now posed by the actions of the
United States, our closest ally. Canada, to be true to its deepest values
centering on the rule of law, cannot be silent.
The contradiction between what NATO countries say in the NPT
context and do in the NATO context is astounding. The very same countries
– including Canada – that, in the NPT context, pledge an “unequivocal
undertaking” to the total elimination of nuclear weapons then, in the NATO
context, reaffirm that nuclear weapons “are essential.” Through its
commitment to the NPT and the 13 Steps for total elimination of nuclear
weapons and, at the same time, its allegiance to NATO, Canada is caught in
an incoherent posture. The contradiction of Canada’s nuclear weapons
policies going in two opposite directions at the same time must be dealt
with. Canadian Pugwash subscribes to the analysis of this dilemma
presented by Project Ploughshares:

4

Nearly sixty years after the advent of the nuclear age, Canada
still maintains a fundamentally ambiguous policy toward
nuclear weapons. The Canadian government rules out
acquiring its own nuclear weapons, opposes nuclear
proliferation, and asserts that “the only sustainable strategy for
the future is the elimination of nuclear weapons entirely.” But
it also supports the continued possession of nuclear weapons by
its allies, participates in a nuclear-armed alliance, and endorses
NATO’s plan to retain nuclear weapons “for the foreseeable
future.” The Canadian government continues to state that the
defence of Canada must rely on the “nuclear umbrella” that the
United States and other NATO allies have unfurled above this
country, and it continues to provide both physical and political
support for those weapons in a variety of ways. In short, while
the Canadian government condemns any reliance on nuclear
weapons by non-allied countries, it continues to treat those
same weapons as a useful – even necessary – element of
Canada’s defences and those of its allies.2

B. New Policy Directions on Nuclear Weapons.
Contrary to popular belief, the nuclear weapons problem is not “going
away.”
It is staggering to reflect on the total number of nuclear weapons still
in existence. The estimated number is 34,145.

2

“Canada and Nuclear Weapons: Canadian Policies Related to, and Connections to, Nuclear Weapons,” By Bill
Robinson, Project Ploughshares Working Paper 01-5, October, 2002.
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Country
United States
Russia
TOTAL
Percent of Total

Strategic
Tactical
Warheads Warheads

Warheads
in Storage

7,013
5,858

5,000
9,421

1,620
4,000

*Data for the U.S. and Russian arsenals is taken
from the Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace (see
www.ceip.org/files/pdf/Policybrief23.pdf) and, for
the other nuclear weapon states, the Natural
Resources Defense Council (see
www.nrdc.org/nuclear/nudb/datainx.asp). It should
be noted that estimates of the composition and
evolution of the arsenals for China, Israel, India and
Pakistan are extremely difficult to make and these
figures are necessarily estimates.

TOTAL
13,633
19,279
32,912
96 percent

United Kingdom
France
China

200
350
400

India
Pakistan
Israel

35
48
200

TOTAL

34,145*

It is a counterproductive political policy for the five permanent
members of the U.N. Security Council to think that they can have almost an
exclusive right to possess nuclear weapons while other countries are
prohibited from acquiring them. The responsibility for the looming prospect
of a nuclear war of some dimension can be laid squarely on the United
States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France and China. They have been
warned time and again by both governments and civil society leaders that
their refusal to honour their legal obligation to negotiate the total elimination
of their nuclear arsenals is leading to the breakdown of the Non-Proliferation
Treaty.
When the NPT was indefinitely extended in 1995, the nuclear powers
made three promises:
• A Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty would be achieved
by 1996. Though former U.S. President Bill Clinton was the first to sign the
Treaty, the succeeding Bush Administration turned its back on it, and entryinto-force is now effectively blocked.
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• Negotiations on a convention to ban the production of fissile
material for nuclear weapons would come to an “early conclusion.” With
several nuclear weapons states blocking progress, the Conference on
Disarmament cannot even agree on a format for negotiations let alone carry
them out.
• “Systematic and progressive efforts globally” to eliminate
nuclear weapons would be made. It is said that the Moscow Treaty of 2002,
signed by the U.S. and Russia, shows compliance because it will reduce the
number of deployed strategic warheads on each side to a range of 1,700 to
2,200 by 2012. But these weapons will be stored in reserve, not dismantled,
and there are no verification procedures. The key principle of irreversibility,
one of the NPT 13 Steps, is not met.
In short, the pledges made in 1995 have been abandoned. The ruling
of the International Court of Justice that states have an obligation to
conclude negotiations for the elimination of nuclear weapons, has been
ignored. The “unequivocal undertaking” toward total elimination, given in
2000, has been pushed aside. Jayantha Dhanapala, U.N. Under-SecretaryGeneral for Disarmament Affairs, calls the gulf between declaration and
deeds “alarming.” Instead of genuine progress in nuclear disarmament, the
world has seen the abrogation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty,
the development of improved nuclear weapons, the prospect of more nuclear
tests, and plans for the use of nuclear weapons even against non-nuclear
weapon states. Each day, the warning of the Canberra Commission rings
more true: “The possession of nuclear weapons by any state is a constant
stimulus to others to acquire them.” North Korea is but one current
example.
During 2001, the Bush Administration conducted a Nuclear Posture
Review (NPR), which made clear that its nuclear weapons stockpile remains
a cornerstone of U.S. national security policy. The NPR establishes
expansive plans to revitalize U.S. nuclear forces, and all the elements that
support them, within a New Triad of capabilities that combine nuclear and
conventional offensive strikes with missile defences and nuclear-weapons
infrastructure. The NPR assumes that nuclear weapons will be part of U.S.
military forces for at least the next 50 years; it plans an extensive and
expensive series of programs to modernize the existing force, including a
new ICBM to be operational in 2020 and a new heavy bomber in 2040. The
NPR says that there are four reasons to possess nuclear weapons: to “assure
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allies and friends”; “dissuade competitors”; “deter aggressors”; and “defeat
enemies.”
It also lists specific scenarios for using nuclear weapons: A conflict
with China over Taiwan, a North Korean attack on South Korea, and an
attack by Iraq on Israel or another neighbour. The new policy means that the
United States will threaten the use of nuclear weapons against countries that
do not themselves possess nuclear weapons; such an action runs counter to
the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Thus, under the guise of participating in
nuclear disarmament through the dismantling of excess nuclear weapons, the
U.S. is actually widening the role of nuclear weapons far beyond the
deterrence measures against the former Soviet Union in the Cold War. New
U.S. policy directly challenges Canadian policy, which holds that the only
value of nuclear weapons is political, not military. U.S. intentions are stated
clearly in the NPR:
Nuclear weapons play a critical role in the defence capabilities
of the United States, its allies and friends. They provide
credible military options to deter a wide range of threats,
including WMD and large-scale conventional military force.
These nuclear capabilities possess unique proportions that give
the United States options to hold at risk classes of targets [that
are] important to achieve strategic and political objectives.
When the NPR is seen in the context of President Bush’s National
Security Strategy, an alarming prospect of the use of nuclear weapons comes
into view. The new Strategy says that the U.S. will take anticipatory action
to defend itself, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the
enemy’s attack. The Strategy states: “To forestall or prevent ... hostile acts
by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act preemptively.”
The 2003 war against Iraq flowed from this strategy.
Further, the U.S. has stated that it “reserves the right to respond with
overwhelming force – including through resort to all of our options – to the
use of WMD against the United States, our forces abroad, and friends and
allies” (emphasis added). Has Canada given its assent to be included in such
a policy? If so, were Canadians ever informed of the implications? If not,
has Canada protested being included in a contravention of international law?
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Concerned about a widened rationale for the use of nuclear weapons,
ten U.S. senators, led by Senator Edward M. Kennedy of Massachusetts,
sent a letter February 21, 2003 to President Bush, expressing “grave
concern” about U.S. policy. They rejected a policy contemplating the option
of using nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear state:
…Such a shift in U.S. policy would deepen the danger of
nuclear proliferation by effectively telling non-nuclear states
that nuclear weapons are necessary to deter a potential U.S.
attack, and by sending a green light to the world’s nuclear states
that it is permissible to use them. Is this the lesson we want to
send to North Korea, India, Pakistan, or any other nuclear
power?
Faced with a constantly modernizing U.S. nuclear arsenal and new
high tech systems of which missile defences are only one part, existing
nuclear weapons states are likely to retain their nuclear stocks. And more
states, seeing that nuclear weapons are the currency of power, may follow
India, Pakistan and Israel’s recourse to acquiring nuclear weapons. The
danger of a nuclear catastrophe grows.
That catastrophe may well be set off by terrorists. Immediately after
September 11, U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan went to Ground Zero in
New York and said that, as horrible as the destruction was, how much worse
it would have been had the terrorists used nuclear devices. He called on
nations to “re-double” efforts to implement fully the relevant treaties to stop
the spread of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. In the case of
the Non-Proliferation Treaty, it is not a multiplication of efforts we are
witnessing, but a subtraction.
It is the lack of an enforceable convention to shut off the development
and production of nuclear weapons and fissile materials that has resulted in
the new risk of nuclear terrorism. There has been resolution after resolution
at the U.N. for a Nuclear Weapons Convention; the resolutions actually pass
with handsome majorities (although Canada has never voted in favour).
Public opinion polls throughout the world show that people heavily favour
the abolition of all nuclear weapons. But the major states refuse to enter
such negotiations, so determined are they to preserve their nuclear strength.
Now the world faces not only the traditional prospect of a nuclear war
between states but the use of a nuclear weapon by terrorists who steal
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nuclear materials. In this new age of suicidal terrorism, the threat of attacks
using weapons of mass destruction has grown exponentially. Virtually all
experts on the subject say it is not a question of whether a nuclear attack will
occur, but when.
The new U.S. policies have brought the world to a new moment
regarding nuclear weapons. Instead of progress towards elimination, we are
seeing the dismantling of the non-proliferation regime, constructed so
laboriously over the past three decades. NATO is caught up in this
dismantling. And so is Canada.

C. Next Steps for Canada
At the very least, Canada must stop thinking that piecemeal steps,
such as formulating better reporting requirements, are enough to save the
NPT. A more substantive policy is urgently called for. The erosion of the
NPT is occurring before our eyes, and present trend lines will lead to its
collapse. The end of the NPT would endanger the full gamut of Canada’s
security policies.
A regenerated Canadian policy should center around new efforts to
give life to the following words, contained in the Final Document of the
NPT 2000 Review, which all NPT states parties agreed to:
… the total elimination of nuclear weapons is the only
absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of
nuclear weapons.
World pressure must be mounted on the nuclear weapons states to
implement these words through the adoption of a Nuclear Weapons
Convention, banning the production, deployment, and use of nuclear
weapons. An obvious place to start is to call for a U.N. Security Council
Summit on all Weapons of Mass Destruction, in which the nuclear weapons
powers would have to face up to their responsibilities. Since it does not
appear that the permanent members of the Security Council (i.e., the
declared nuclear weapons states) are disposed to hold such a Summit, then it
is logical to advance the longstanding request of U.N. Secretary-General
Kofi Annan to the international community to hold an international
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conference on nuclear dangers. All states, not just NPT adherents, would be
invited.
In advancing this proposal through a resolution at the U.N., and even
offering to hold the conference in Canada, the Government would strengthen
both the NPT and the role of the United Nations in nuclear disarmament. It
would focus the attention of the world on the overarching fact that the only
way to guarantee safety from a nuclear weapons attack is through
elimination backed up by an intensive verification regime. This would be a
bold move by Canada, wholly consistent with its stated policy of seeking the
total elimination of all weapons of mass destruction. Moreover, such a
concerted campaign to rid the world of nuclear weapons would advance
another important Canadian objective: strengthening the legal regime that
underpins the multilateral system.
This concentrated attention on the objective of nuclear disarmament –
the elimination of nuclear weapons through the adoption of a universal
convention – will re-focus the attention of the public in an intelligible way.
It must be emphasized that the object of this exercise is not just to talk about
the growing nuclear dangers, but to take action. The millions around the
world who marched recently for peace show the growing public aversion to
war. People – and governments – seeking to lessen the risk of catastrophe
through the elimination of nuclear weapons must be listened to.
It is recognized that advancing such a policy may incur the
displeasure, if not the hostility, of the United States. It must be explained
that the object of the policy is not to counter the U.S., but to advance
Canadian interests in breaking out of the incoherent posture we and NATO
are now in, and also to save the legal regime for the elimination of nuclear
weapons. It is entirely proper for a friendly neighbour to point out to the
U.S. that its nuclear weapons policies must implement legal commitments.
Moreover, it is also proper for Canada to remind the U.S. of what it
promised concerning compliance: “We must ensure compliance with
relevant international agreements, including the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty, the Chemical Weapons Convention, and the Biological Weapons
Convention.” (National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction
September 17, 2002, p.2). Canada should point out that the holding of an
international conference would be a method of supporting the U.S. in
building broad international support for universal compliance with existing
regimes.
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Canada must admit, frankly, that the ambiguities and contradictions of
the present moment are no longer tolerable in a world of escalating nuclear
danger. U.S. policies, which dominate the NATO position on nuclear
weapons, must be clarified. France and the U.K. have been saying for a long
time that they will join in nuclear disarmament negotiations once the
numbers of nuclear weapons held by the U.S. and Russia are substantially
(and definitively) reduced. Russia, as a “junior” (and aspiring to be a
“senior”) member of NATO, will not cling to a nuclear system it can no
longer afford. Smaller NATO countries, like Germany, Belgium and
Denmark question NATO’s nuclear policy. Many countries outside the
NATO club, such as China, have consistently voted at the U.N. for a Nuclear
Weapons Convention.
Thus, Canadian leadership at this moment would be realistic as well
as courageous. Canada has the credibility to launch such a campaign. It has
tried to move NATO forward; it has voted for the New Agenda Coalition
omnibus resolution. Canada is now instrumentally positioned to be a
“bridge” between NATO and the New Agenda Coalition3. It could
meaningfully transmit New Agenda views to NATO and vice versa. Closing
the gap between the two would be a signal act of leadership on nuclear
disarmament and go a long way to ensuring the survival of the NPT after the
2005 Review.
Canadian Pugwash is not suggesting that Canada’s policies on nuclear
weapons elimination should rely solely on the holding of an international
conference. Rather, the conference would be a method of stimulating
renewed international energy into fulfilling priority steps for nuclear
disarmament. The following priorities, suggested by the Middle Powers
Initiative, 4 are endorsed by Canadian Pugwash. We urge the Government of
Canada to incorporate them and work actively with the New Agenda
Coalition for their fulfillment:
1. Strategic arm s reductions: Implement the May 2002 U.S.-Russian
strategic nuclear arms treaty in accordance with NPT principles so that
reduced warheads and their delivery systems are irreversibly dismantled in a
transparent and verifiable manner; de-alert remaining deployed U.S. and
3

4

The New Agenda Coalition includes Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa and Sweden.

“Priorities for Preserving the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in the New Strategic Context:” Middle Powers
Initiative Briefing Paper, August 1, 2002.
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Russian nuclear forces in accordance with the NPT commitment to further
reduce the operational status of nuclear weapons systems.
2. Control of missile defenses and non-proliferation of missiles: Negotiate
regarding plans for missile defenses to avoid obstruction of the process of
nuclear arms control and disarmament and to promote international stability
and the principle of undiminished security for all; prevent missile
proliferation, through ad hoc arrangements, as with North Korea, and
through developing proposals for a missile flight test moratorium and
missile control regimes combining disarmament and non-proliferation
objectives.
3. Tactical arms reductions: Unilaterally remove U.S. bombs deployed
under NATO auspices in Europe; create a wider process of control of U.S.
and Russian tactical weapons, including through a) reporting on the 19911992 Presidential initiatives; b) formalizing those initiatives, including
verification; c) in accordance with NATO proposals, reciprocally
exchanging information regarding readiness, safety, and sub-strategic forces;
and d) commencing U.S.-Russian negotiations on reduction of non-strategic
nuclear weapons.
4. Non-use of nuclear weapons: Reverse trends toward expansion of
options for use of nuclear weapons, including against non-nuclear weapon
countries, exemplified by the U.S. Nuclear Posture Review; establish the
absolute refusal of middle power countries in multilateral or bilateral
security alliances with the United States to participate in or support first use
of nuclear weapons or to prepare for such use.
5. Ban on nuclear testing: Observe the moratorium on nuclear testing;
achieve entry into force of the CTBT; close the test sites in Nevada and
Novaya Zemlya; renounce development of new or modified nuclear
weapons as contrary to the 2000 commitment to a diminishing role of
nuclear weapons in security policies and the Article VI obligation of
cessation of the nuclear arms race.
6. Control of fissile materials: Building on heightened awareness of the
threat of terrorist use of nuclear devices and materials, a) create a process of
accounting for and control of fissile materials holdings on a worldwide basis
in accordance with NPT principles of transparency, irreversibility and
verification, with the objective of establishing a global inventory of all
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weapon-usable fissile materials and nuclear weapons; b) commence
negotiations on a fissile materials ban; and c) mandate and increase funding
of the IAEA eight-point plan to improve protection of nuclear materials and
facilities against acts of terrorism.
*

*

*

These are the steps the international community and Canada need to
take in order to move toward a nuclear weapons-free future and a more
secure world. By hosting such an international conference, Canada would be
acting consistently, reflecting its record as the only country during the Cold
War that had the ability and resources to develop nuclear weapons — but
refrained from doing so. The federal government also has considerable
experience organizing international conferences where international norms
were substantively changed because of Canadian efforts. The Ottawa
Landmines Process and the International Criminal Court are only two such
examples.
An international conference needs to be preceded by a sustained effort
to stimulate the public’s interest so that individuals feel they, too, can make
a difference. Representatives from various non-governmental organizations
(NGOs) could hold a preparatory conference, attended by experts, concerned
citizens and youth from across Canada and around the world. It would also
be important to hold prior workshops with leaders in disarmament and
experts in arms control from NATO and New Agenda Coalition countries.
A Canadian-sponsored conference might help to stimulate a sea change in
opinion, prompting politicians, the international media and ministries of
foreign affairs and defence to take notice.
The federal government has taken a lead role before in moving world
opinion. Canadians are proud of Lester B. Pearson’s efforts to establish
peacekeeping forces, Pierre Trudeau’s opening up to China and his peace
initiative, Brian Mulroney’s efforts to end apartheid in South Africa, André
Ouellet’s report to the UN on rapid reaction forces and Lloyd Axworthy’s
Landmines initiative. With the prospect of nuclear war looming, the time is
urgent for Canada to take such an initiative to assure our world a safer
future.
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APPENDIX “A”
(The following excerpt from the Final Document of the NPT 2000 Review Conference
contains the 13 Practical Steps agreed to by all parties to the NPT)
15. The Conference agrees on the following practical steps for the systematic and
progressive efforts to implement Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons and paragraphs 3 and 4 (c) of the 1995 Decision on 'Principles and
Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament':
1. The importance and urgency of signatures and ratifications, without delay and without
conditions and in accordance with constitutional processes, to achieve the early entry into
force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.
2. A moratorium on nuclear weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions
pending entry into force of that Treaty.
3. The necessity of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on a nondiscriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning
the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices
in accordance with the statement of the Special Coordinator in 1995 and the mandate
contained therein, taking into consideration both nuclear disarmament and nuclear nonproliferation objectives. The Conference on Disarmament is urged to agree on a
programme of work which includes the immediate commencement of negotiations on
such a treaty with a view to their conclusion within five years.
4. The necessity of establishing in the Conference on Disarmament an appropriate
subsidiary body with a mandate to deal with nuclear disarmament. The Conference on
Disarmament is urged to agree on a programme of work which includes the immediate
establishment of such a body.
5. The principle of irreversibility to apply to nuclear disarmament, nuclear and other
related arms control and reduction measures.
6. An unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon states to accomplish the total
elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament to which all States
Parties are committed under Article VI.
7. The early entry into force and full implementation of START II and the conclusion of
START III as soon as possible while preserving and strengthening the ABM Treaty as a
cornerstone of strategic stability and as a basis for further reductions of strategic
offensive weapons, in accordance with its provisions.
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8. The completion and implementation of the Trilateral Initiative between the United
States of America, the Russian Federation and the International Atomic Energy Agency.
9. Steps by all the nuclear-weapon states leading to nuclear disarmament in a way that
promotes international stability, and based on the principle of undiminished security for
all:
•
•

•

•
•

•

Further efforts by the nuclear-weapon states to reduce their nuclear arsenals
unilaterally.
Increased transparency by the nuclear-weapon states with regard to their nuclear
weapons capabilities and the implementation of agreements pursuant to Article VI
and as a voluntary confidence-building measure to support further progress on
nuclear disarmament.
The further reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons, based on unilateral
initiatives and as an integral part of the nuclear arms reduction and disarmament
process.
Concrete agreed measures to further reduce the operational status of nuclear
weapons systems.
A diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies to minimise the risk
that these weapons ever be used and to facilitate the process of their total
elimination.
The engagement as soon as appropriate of all the nuclear-weapon states in the
process leading to the total elimination of their nuclear weapons.

10. Arrangements by all nuclear-weapon states to place, as soon as practicable, fissile
material designated by each of them as no longer required for military purposes under
IAEA or other relevant international verification and arrangements for the disposition of
such material for peaceful purposes, to ensure that such material remains permanently
outside of military programmes.
11. Reaffirmation that the ultimate objective of the efforts of States in the disarmament
process is general and complete disarmament under effective international control.
12. Regular reports, within the framework of the NPT strengthened review process, by all
States parties on the implementation of Article VI and paragraph 4 (c) of the 1995
Decision on 'Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament',
and recalling the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice of 8 July 1996.
13. The further development of the verification capabilities that will be required to
provide assurance of compliance with nuclear disarmament agreements for the
achievement and maintenance of a nuclear-weapon-free world.

